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Discrimination and the Limits of Textualism 
 
Eliot T. Tracz* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The use of statutes to discriminate against minorities, whether racial, ethnic, or 
religious, has had a long history in the United States as a tactic for enforcing 
unconstitutional and illegal social policies. While the United States Supreme Court 
has a history of striking down such statutes, recent developments have changed the 
way statutes are interpreted, as well as the manner in which statutes are drafted. 
In this brief Article, I examine the intellectual and judicial history of textualism, 
including its limitations, before applying a textualist analysis to two examples of 
discriminatory voting laws drafted using neutral language. It is my aim to show that 
textualism falls short in its ability to discover and adequately dispose of 
discriminatory laws drafted using sophisticated language to hide discriminatory 
intent and that, at least in this category of cases, it is acceptable to consider legislative 
intent. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 For much of the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, the United 
States Supreme Court looked to legislative intent as the essence of statutory 
interpretation.1 The 1980s saw a revolution in statutory interpretation emerging 
through both judicial activity and legal academia.2 This was the beginning of the 
emergence of the method of statutory interpretation known as textualism. 
Although textualism lacks an exact definition, it can be identified by its chief 
characteristics: the practice of judicial adherence to the “public meaning of the 
enacted text, understood in context,” and the general rejection of legislative history 
as evidence of judicial intent.3 In other words, textualists seek to “read the words of 
[a statutory] text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them . . . and 
apply the meaning so determined.”4 
                                                           
*  J.D. DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to Kellie Tracz for her insights during the 
writing process. Any errors are entirely my own. 
1  See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005); see also 
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713–14 (1975) (“Our objective . . . is to ascertain the congressional 
intent and give effect to the legislative will.”); ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 38 (1904) (“The object of 
construction, as has been often said by the courts and writers of authority, is to ascertain the legislative 
intent, and, if possible, to effectuate the purposes of the lawmakers.”). 
2  Manning, supra note 1, at 419–20. 
3  Id. at 420. 
4  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The cause of textualism has been chiefly advanced through the work of the late 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and the jurisprudence and academic work of 
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit.5 Under their stewardship, courts 
have moved away from consideration of legislative intent and now, as is proper, “[t]he 
text of the law is the law.”6 This approach has yielded good results in cases ranging 
from securities regulation violations to criminal offenses.7 
Yet textualism is not without its limits. Even the staunchest textualists 
recognize that where adherence to the text would lead to an absurd or 
unconstitutional outcome, it is appropriate to consider legislative history in order to 
determine the intent of the statute.8 This short Article contends that another class of 
cases, those alleging discrimination despite facially neutral statutes, may require the 
use of statutory interpretation in order to arrive at the best possible outcome. 
Part II looks at the history and development as well as the core beliefs of 
textualism as a method of statutory interpretation. Beginning with the decline of 
purposivism and the focus on the purpose or intent of a statute, it then moves on to 
discuss the influence of Supreme Court justices and appellate judges in the move 
toward textualism. Finally, it touches on the adoption of textualism as the preferred 
method of statutory interpretation for the United States Supreme Court. 
Part III discusses the limits of textualism. It is widely accepted among 
textualists that when strict adherence to the text of a statute would lead to an absurd 
or potentially unconstitutional result, it is appropriate to consider information such 
as legislative history.9 This Article goes a step further and argues that there is 
another scenario, cases alleging discrimination, in which examining the legislative 
history and other available, related information is appropriate. 
Finally, in Part IV, this Article examines two cases alleging discrimination, as 
well as the courts’ reasoning in finding that discriminatory intent did exist. After 
examining both cases, this Part discusses how the outcome would likely be different 
had the courts applied a textualist method of statutory interpretation. These cases 
expose textualism’s inability to address facially neutral statutes that implement 
discriminatory actions. 
 
I. TEXTUALISM 
 
A. A Purposivist History 
                                                           
5  William N. Eskridge, Jr. The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 650 (1990) (“…Justice Scalia and 
Judge Easterbrook have essentially founded a new school of legislative history”.) 
6  Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 (2016) (reviewing 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
7  See, e.g.,  Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (holding that §10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not provide a cause of action for foreign plaintiffs against 
American defendants in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges);  Brogan v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §1001 does not allow the use of an “exculpatory no”). 
8  See,  Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, And Statutory Interpretations, 75 U. of Cinn. 
L.Rev. 25 (2006) (arguing that many textualists are willing to consider alternative approaches when a 
strict textualist approach yields an untenable result.) 
9  Id.  
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Through most of the twentieth century, courts, including the Supreme Court, 
leaned toward a purposivist view of statutory construction, which means that when 
the statute’s plain text appeared to contradict its evident purpose, courts would often 
elevate the purpose of the statute over the text.10 This line of statutory interpretation 
can be traced back to the nineteenth-century case of Church of the Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States,11 in which the Supreme Court chose to eschew “the letter of 
the statute” in favor of its “spirit.”12 It became a policy of the Court that “even when 
the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 
‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has 
followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.”13 
Purposivism considers the perceived intent of the framers of a piece of 
legislation as well as the intentions of the Congress which passed it. For this reason, 
purposivist judges have felt that: 
 
Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the 
result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems 
inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is 
“rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude 
consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.”14 
 
Yet, it would be inaccurate to suggest that all purposivist judges ignored all statutory 
text. Judge Learned Hand acknowledged that “the words used, even in their literal 
sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the 
meaning of any writing.”15 But even Judge Hand was quick to qualify his statements 
by writing that “it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed 
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that 
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and 
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”16 
 The emphasis on legislative intent, however, is the greatest flaw of purposivist 
jurisprudence. Ascribing a collective intent to a piece of legislation passed by a 
multimember legislature is impossible.17 In a functional democracy, a piece of 
                                                           
10  Anton Metlitsky, The Roberts Court and the New Textualism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 671, 674 (2016). 
11  143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
12  Id. at 459. 
13  United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940) (citations omitted). 
14  Pub. Citizens v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989) (quoting Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)). 
15  Id. at 454–55 (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
16  Id. 
17  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 284 (1992) (“[T]he concept of ‘an’ intent for a person is fictive and for an 
institution hilarious. A hunt for this snipe liberates the interpreter, who can attribute to the drafters 
whatever ‘intent’ serves purposes derived by other means.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains] (“Because legislatures 
comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable.”); Antonin 
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legislation that receives bicameral approval as well as a presidential signature 
represents a series of compromises from a number of parties with different intents or 
agendas, as well as the inevitable votes of individuals who have not read the bill at 
all. Further, if courts place higher value on the purpose or “intent” of the statute, then 
the written text of the statute reflects imperfectly what the law truly is.18 In other 
words, the true law is in the minds of the enacting legislature rather than on the 
printed page of statutory text.19  
 
B. Textualism: A Method of Statutory Interpretation 
 
In the early 1980s, purposivism began to face an intellectual backlash from 
conservative judges. Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, embracing public 
choice theory, asserted that judicial reliance on legislative history to discern 
legislative intent merely results in “wild guesses.”20 Just a few years later a newly 
appointed Supreme Court Justice named Antonin Scalia would echo this sentiment 
in a remarkable concurring opinion in the otherwise unremarkable case of INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca.21 This case dealt with a question regarding the Immigration & 
Nationality Act of 1952. Section 243(h) of the Act required that the Attorney General 
withhold the deportation of an alien who can demonstrate, through special factors, 
that their “life or freedom would be threatened.”22 In 1980, Congress added § 208(a),23 
which granted the Attorney General the discretion to grant asylum to a “refugee” who 
is unwilling to return to their home due to a “well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social group, or 
political opinion.”24 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) determined that Ms. 
Cardoza-Fonseca could not remain in the United States under either provision 
because there was no “clear probability” that she would be persecuted were she to be 
deported to her native Nicaragua.25 Arguing that the INS applied an incorrect burden 
of proof to her § 208(a) request, Ms. Cardoza-Fonseca appealed the decision. Upon 
review, the Supreme Court agreed with Ms. Cardoza-Fonseca and agreed that § 
208(a) only required a “good reason” to fear future persecution.26 The Court reasoned 
that the “ordinary and obvious meaning” of § 208(a) is that the burden is more lenient 
                                                           
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 517 (“[T]he 
quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase.”).   
18  Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 59, 60 (1988). 
19  Id. at 60–61. 
20  Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 15, at 548. 
21   480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
22  8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) (originally enacted as Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 
243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952)). 
23  Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 208(a), (b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(a) (1976)). 
24  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988) (definition of “refugee” who is entitled to asylum under § 208(a)). 
25  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 425.  
26  Id. at 438. 
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than the probability standard of § 243(h).27 The legislative history of the statute, 
especially legislative expectations that the 1980 amendment would bring the United 
States into conformance with international practices that required less than a 
probability standard for refugees seeking asylum, provided confirmation to support 
the Court’s opinion.28 
While Scalia agreed with the majority opinion that the statute in question 
supported Ms. Cardoza-Fonseca, he would not join the majority opinion because he 
found any discussion of legislative intent to be irrelevant.29 In support of his stance, 
Scalia wrote:  
 
Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval 
of this doctrine [that legislative history can sometimes trump plain 
meaning], that is to my mind an ill-advised deviation from the venerable 
principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language must 
be given effect—at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.30 
 
Justice Scalia would continue to build on this idea, laying a foundation for textualism 
as a method of statutory interpretation which would continue to be developed by 
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, 
and former Judge and later Solicitor General Kenneth Starr. 
 So what does textualism entail? The trait that ultimately distinguishes 
textualists from proponents of other methods of statutory interpretation is that 
textualists reject internal legislative history, like the statements of a sponsor or the 
report of committee, because it is an unreliable proxy for the intentions of a whole 
legislative body.31 Because textualists eschew the idea of legislative intent, what is 
left is “to read the words of [a statutory] text as any ordinary Member of Congress 
would have read them, . . . and apply the meaning so determined.”32 
 A major reason for textualists’ disdain for legislative history is that many 
textualists believe that giving authority to unenacted expressions of legislative intent 
violates the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment.33 
Furthermore, legislation pushed by special interest groups is likely to reflect the 
intent of very few members of Congress and more likely to reflect the interests of 
those groups.34 Some theorists have even gone so far as to suggest that legislation 
can be viewed as a commodity, part of an economic transaction between special 
                                                           
27  Id. at 430–32. 
28  Id. at 432–43. 
29  William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990). 
30  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
31  See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 361–67 (2005). 
32  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
33  John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 695 (1997); see also 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
34  See Manning, supra note 31, at 687. 
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interest groups and legislators.35 To a certain extent, textualism contains a healthy 
skepticism toward the ability of judges to discern the intent of a legislative body. 
 Similarly, textualists favor what Professor Caleb Nelson has termed a “rule-
like” principle.36 This means that statutory directives may include generalizations 
that implementing officials might find ill suited in certain cases but that they follow 
nonetheless.37 This rule-like principle can best be illustrated by the well-known case 
of United States v. Locke.38 In that case, the Supreme Court had to address the 
question of whether a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) filing made on December 
31 was timely. The statute in question required that all filings to preserve certain 
rights to extract minerals from federal lands had to be filed prior to December 31.39 
The textualists, along with BLM, interpreted the statute as meaning that the filings 
could not be filed any later than December 30 and still be considered timely.40 
 
C. Supreme Court Textualism 
 
Since the ascendancy of the late Justice Scalia to the Supreme Court, that 
Court has seemingly adopted textualism as its standard means of statutory 
interpretation.41 Both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have demonstrated a 
propensity toward favoring textualism as means of statutory interpretation, even 
going so far as to frame cases decided in a non-textualist manner in textualist 
language.42 Along the way, both Courts endeavored to “emphasize the unyielding 
quality of a semantically clear statutory text.”43 
Often considered a conservative44 method of statutory interpretation, and 
espoused most visibly by conservative or conservative-leaning judges such as Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, or Judges Easterbrook, Kavanaugh, or Kozinski, it is perhaps not 
surprising that a conservative-leaning Supreme Court would adopt textualism as its 
standard method of statutory interpretation. However, even liberal Justice Elena 
                                                           
35  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 
18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (arguing that interest groups “purchase” legislation using “campaign 
contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes.”). 
36  Nelson, supra note 29, at 374. 
37  Id. at 375 (citing FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 51–52 (1991)).  
38  471 U.S. 84 (1985). 
39  43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (2000). 
40  Locke, 471 U.S. at 90. 
41  See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2118 (“Statutory interpretation has improved dramatically over 
the last generation, thanks to the extraordinary influence of Justice Scalia. Statutory text matters 
much more than it once did. If the text is sufficiently clear, the text usually controls. The text of the law 
is the law.”) (footnotes omitted). 
42  See Metlitsky, supra note 8, at 684–89 (arguing that textualism is so deeply ingrained in the Roberts 
Court that it refuses to offer any alternative type of framing, even when another type of statutory 
interpretation better suits the case).  
43  John Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 125 (2011). 
44  It is debatable whether adhering to the text of a statute is a mark of Conservatism or instead of judicial 
restraint.  
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Kagan has admitted an adherence to textualism to a certain degree.45 This seemingly 
bipartisan statement of support for textualism speaks to the perceived effectiveness 
it yields as a frame of statutory exegesis, as well as its appeal on more than simple 
ideological grounds. 
 
 
II. THE LIMITS OF TEXTUALISM 
 
Despite its growing wide use and support, textualism is not without its limits. 
Most textualists will agree that occasionally cases appear in which applying the text 
of a statute alone will lead to a conclusion that is either “absurd or unconstitutional.” 
I would argue, however, that there is another scenario in which textualism is not an 
effective tool for statutory interpretation: cases alleging discrimination. This section 
looks at both of these situations in order to examine the true limits of textualism and 
when a consideration of legislative history may be appropriate. 
 
A. Absurd or Unconstitutional Outcome 
 
On occasion, the manner in which a law is drafted may result in language 
which is unclear; at other times the language may, if taken at face value, result in an 
outcome which is either absurd or even unconstitutional. Whether such outcomes are 
a result of scrivener’s error, technical subject matter beyond the ken of a busy 
Congress-person, or that no one in the legislature read the law closely before voting 
on it, what matters is that the text itself leads to an untenable result. In such a case, 
looking at the available, relevant legislative materials is a constructive means to 
allow the court to reach the best decision. 
One such example is the case of Green v. Bock Laundry Co.46 In that case the 
plaintiff,  Mr. Paul Green, was an inmate at a county prison.47 Mr. Green was 
fortunate enough to obtain work release employment at a nearby car wash.48 Six days 
into his new job, Mr. Green reached inside a large dryer in an attempt to cause it to 
stop.49 As a result, his right arm was subsequently caught by a heavy, rotating drum 
and separated from his body.50 Mr. Green then brought suit against Bock, the 
manufacturer of the machine.51 
At trial, Mr. Green testified that he had been instructed inadequately 
concerning the operation of the machine, as well as concerning its dangerous 
                                                           
45  Interview by John Manning with Justice Elena Kagan, U.S. Justice, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue 
with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes at Harvard Law School, at 8:28 (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation (“I think we are 
all textualists now in a way that just was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”). 
46  490 U.S. 504 (1989). 
47  Id. at 506. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
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character.52 Bock impeached Mr. Green’s testimony by eliciting admissions that he 
had been convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary.53 The jury 
returned a verdict for Bock.54 Mr. Green appealed, arguing the district court had 
erred by denying his pretrial motion to exclude impeaching evidence.55 
On appeal, the court was asked to determine whether Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(a)(1) was appropriately applied. At the time Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) 
read as follows: 
 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from the witness or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime was (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the 
witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant . . . .56 
 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that the court was “confronted here with 
a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps 
unconstitutional, result. Our task is to give some alternative meaning to the word 
‘defendant’ in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) that avoids this consequence.”57 
 On its face, the plain text of the statute requires the weighing of prejudice to a 
defendant in both civil and criminal trials.58 Evidence of Mr. Green’s convictions may 
have a prejudicial effect on his case, but none on defendant Bock’s case. Under a strict 
reading of Rule 609(a)(1), which allowed admissions of any impeaching evidence with 
minimal probative value (and we assume any evidence being offered for impeachment 
has some probative value), the balancing required by Rule 609(a)(1) would lead to the 
evidence in Mr. Green’s case being admissible.59 Furthermore, such a reading would 
mean that impeachment detrimental to a plaintiff would always have to be 
admitted.60 
 Such an outcome is, for many reasons, an undesirable one. In cases such as 
Green where the judge is faced with an inability to interpret a statute using the text 
of the statute, it becomes “entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, 
including the background of Rule 609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption” 
in order to determine how to address the case.61 Ultimately, the majority did choose 
                                                           
52  Id.  
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 509. 
57  Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
58  See id. at 509. 
59  See id. at 509–10. 
60  Id. at 510. 
61  Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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to address the legislative history of Rule 609(a)(1) in order to arrive at the best 
possible decision. 
 
B. Discrimination  
 
While most textualists would stop with cases in which strict adherence to text 
would lead to an absurd or unconstitutional result, there is a second class of cases 
which ought to be considered in light of legislative intent, rather than the text of the 
statute itself. Those cases are discrimination cases. In the past, discriminatory 
statutes were often explicit about their purpose, as in the case of McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma Board of Regents,62 in which an Oklahoma statute required that African-
American students actively be segregated from their white peers.63  
Today, however, “jurisdictions have substantially moved from direct, over[t] 
impediments . . . to more sophisticated devices.”64 If legislatures and special interests 
are growing more sophisticated in their drafting of legislation and moving away from 
such overt language, this signals a problem for textualism as means of statutory 
interpretation. It is this potential difficulty that we examine and discuss in the next 
section of this Article. 
 
 
III. TWO TESTS OF THE EFFICACY OF TEXTUALISM IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 
 
In order to discuss the limits of textualism in cases of discrimination, I have 
selected two voting rights cases to examine. These cases were selected on the simple 
basis that voting rights is currently a hot-button issue. The first case is a recent 
decision from the Fourth Circuit, while the second case is a 1984 Fifth Circuit 
decision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
62  339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
63  The Oklahoma statute at issue read:  
 
Provided, that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to programs of instruction leading to a 
particular degree given at State owned or operated colleges or institutions of higher education of this 
State established for and/or used by the white race, where such programs of instruction leading to a 
particular degree are not given at colleges or institutions of higher education of this State established 
for and/or used by the colored race; provided further, that said programs of instruction leading to a 
particular degree shall be given at such colleges or institutions of higher education upon a segregated 
basis.  
 
Id. at 639 n.1 (quoting 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 445, 456, 457 (1950)). 
64  Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994). 
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A. North Carolina Gerrymandering 
 
For many years, voting has been racially polarized in parts of North Carolina.65 
Such polarization makes minority voters vulnerable to the “tendency of elected 
officials to [seek to] entrench themselves by targeting groups [who are] unlikely to 
[support] them [at the ballot box].”66 For this reason, North Carolina was subject to 
preclearance requirements whenever it sought to change voting rules.67 As a result, 
by 2013 African-American voter registration and turnout was nearly on par with 
white registration and turnout rates.68 In that same year, however, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in Shelby County v. Holder,69 which eliminated preclearance 
obligations in the states that were subject to them.70 The next day, a “leader of the 
party that newly dominated the legislature (and the party that rarely enjoyed African 
American support) announced [the] intention to enact . . . an ‘omnibus’ election law.”71 
The omnibus law, referred to as Session Law (“SL”) 2013-381,72 imposed a 
number of voting restrictions: certain types of ID were no longer valid;73 early voting 
was reduced from seventeen days to ten days;74 same day registration was 
eliminated;75 out of precinct voting was eliminated;76 and preregistration, allowing 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds obtaining driver’s licenses to identify themselves 
and indicate their intent to vote, was eliminated.77 Suit was filed alleging a violation 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.78 At the time of the suit, Section 2 read:  
 
No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, 
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color.79 
 
A district court entered judgment against the plaintiffs on all of their claims, finding 
no discrimination or discriminatory intent under Section 2.80 
                                                           
65  See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (2016) (“Voting in many areas 
of North Carolina is racially polarized.”). 
66  Id. 
67  See id. (noting the years of preclearance and expansion of voting access). 
68  Id. 
69  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
70  McCrory, 831 F.3d at 214. 
71  Id. 
72  2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381. 
73  Id. § 2.1; see also McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216.  
74  See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216.   
75  See id. at 217.  
76  See id. 
77  2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 sec. 12.1, §§ 163-82.1(d), -82.3(a)(5), -82.4(d); see also McCrory, 831 F.3d at 
217–18. 
78  52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)(2012) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)). 
79  Id. 
80  McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219. 
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 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that SL 2013-381 is neutral on its 
face, while at the same time warning that it was still possible that the state may have 
had a discriminatory purpose.81 Before beginning its analysis, the court recognized 
that determining whether discriminatory intent motivates a facially neutral law, 
inquiry must be made into “such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may 
be available.”82 Those factors to be considered include: the historical background of 
the decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, 
departures from normal procedural sequence, and legislative history of the decision.83 
In looking into the legislative history, the court found that prior to enacting 
the omnibus bill, the legislature had requested, and received, information regarding 
minority voting habits including the use of early voting, same day registration, and 
provisional voting.84 The choices of which election changes to make, coupled with 
information obtained by the North Carolina General Assembly, was clear evidence to 
the court of an intent to discriminate.85 The court also took note of the sequence of 
events leading up to passing of the omnibus bill.86 Prior to Shelby County, SL 2013-
318 numbered sixteen pages; soon afterwards it had ballooned to fifty-seven pages.87 
It was rushed through the legislature, spending two days in the Senate and two hours 
in the House (which simply voted on concurrence with the Senate bill, thereby 
removing any potential for amendment).88 The court found this sequence of events to 
be suspect. 
Given the totality of circumstances, it was not difficult for the court to 
determine that the district court had erred and to reverse and remand the case.89 
Whether North Carolina adopts new election laws or otherwise addresses the 
outcome in this case is yet to be seen. The most important takeaway of this case for 
purposes of this Article is that the outcome of this case rests largely on the access of 
the court to legislative history and other non-statutory items.      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
B. Texas At-Large Elections 
 
At least until 1984, the city of Lubbock, Texas, had enjoyed a racially 
homogenous political caste despite the presence of a substantial minority 
population.90 In spite of the size of its population, in the time leading up to the filing 
of this case, no member of a racial minority had ever been elected mayor or to the city 
council.91 At the time, Lubbock was organized so that it was governed by a mayor and 
                                                           
81  See id. at 220.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
82  Id. (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). 
83  Id. 
84  Id. at 216–18, 230. 
85  See id. at 230 (“In sum, relying on this racial data, the General Assembly enacted legislation restricting 
all—and only—practices disproportionately used by African Americans.”). 
86  See id. at 227. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 228. 
89  Id. at 242. 
90  See Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 1984). 
91  Id. at 368. 
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a four-member city council.92 The mayor and all of the council members were elected 
by the entire population in at-large elections, and while Lubbock was divided into 
precincts, it was not necessary for council members to live in any particular part of 
the city.93  
The plaintiffs filed suit in 1976, seeking to force the City of Lubbock to abandon 
its at-large election system.94 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
electoral scheme denied black and Mexican-American voters equal access to the 
political process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.95 At trial, the district court found 
that, although a history of discrimination existed, a system of rules was in place 
which increased the opportunity to discriminate, and the universal lack of success of 
minority candidates, the at-large system was still sufficiently responsive to minority 
needs.96 Accordingly, the court found in favor of the City of Lubbock; an appeal was 
subsequently filed.97 
As the first appeal was pending, major changes occurred in the law, including 
a new Supreme Court ruling requiring that a claim of denial of access by a minority 
to the political processes required a showing of a purpose to discriminate.98 Shortly 
afterwards, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for 
reconsideration.99 While on remand, the U.S. Congress changed the Voting Rights 
Act, effectively overruling the recent Supreme Court case.100 Ultimately, the district 
court found that the at-large system did violate the Fifteenth Amendment and 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.101 As a remedy, the district court drew up plans 
for a six-member city council, with each councilperson coming from a single-voter 
district and the mayor elected at large.102 This appeal followed.103 
The district court found that the at-large electoral scheme violated § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act for a number of reasons. The at-large system was adopted by 
Lubbock in 1917.104 At that time, the voters of Lubbock were concerned about the 
potential for African-American influence on the local election system.105 Between 
1909 and 1924, a local newspaper ran numerous editorials commenting on subjects 
from black enfranchisement to the mere presence of blacks in Lubbock.106 
                                                           
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 368–69. 
97  Id. at 369. 
98  City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66–71 (1980). 
99  Jones, 727 F.2d at 369. 
100  Id.  
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 370. 
105  See id. 
106  Id. 
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Coincidentally, the chairman of the commission tasked with creating the at-large 
system was also the owner and editor of that local paper.107 
The Fifth Circuit agreed with this view, finding that local political conditions 
existed that “disadvantage minorities. In the past, the State of Texas and the City of 
Lubbock discriminated against blacks and Mexican-Americans.”108 In the opinion of 
the court, the persistence of polarized voting signaled that race and ethnicity 
continued to influence the preferences of voters.109 Further, the court found that the 
at-large system diluted the value of minority votes and reduced the political power of 
minority voters.110 The ultimate effect was that white candidates, who largely resided 
in the same, predominately white neighborhoods, dominated city politics.111 
The Fifth Circuit could find no error in the district court’s ruling that the at-
large system was in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.112 Further, the 
court found that the district court’s plan to redraw voting districts was sufficient 
despite some procedural missteps.113 The court reversed the district court’s ruling of 
a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment but affirmed all of the district court’s other 
rulings, including a finding that the at-large system violated the Voting Rights Act.114 
 
C. Analysis      
     
Both of the above cases deal with a very contemporary problem: voting 
restrictions placed on minority voters in order to reduce their political power in 
certain communities. When viewed through the case law, both cases can be easily 
seen for what they are: instances in which discriminatory intent resulted in the 
effective dilution of minority voting power. If viewed through the lens of textualism, 
however, both cases swing toward different results. 
In McCrory, the Fourth Circuit itself acknowledged that the changes 
propounded by SL 2013-381 were facially neutral.115 The ID requirements, reduction 
in days of early voting, and removal of preregistration and same-day registration all 
affected white voters as well, though perhaps not quite as severely. There is no 
indication that SL 2013-381 was drafted with thoughts of race discrimination in 
mind; instead it appears to simply be an attempt to change voting laws. Reviewing 
the text of the statute and applying it to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act produces 
no result which is absurd or unconstitutional. Under a textualist interpretation, SL 
2013-381 passes muster. 
Similarly, the at-large system at issue in Jones is neutral on its face. While the 
effect of running at-large elections for city council positions may ultimately result in 
failure for minority candidates, the at-large system does not target or reduce access 
                                                           
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 383. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 387. 
113  Id. at 386. 
114  Id. at 387. 
115  N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 220 (2016). 
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to the electoral process for minority voters in any explicitly illegal manner. Indeed, 
in an at-large voting system all discriminatory intent must be implicit because every 
voter has an opportunity to vote for every candidate. As with McCrory, a textualist 
review of the at-large system yields no absurd or unconstitutional result; therefore, a 
ruling in favor of the City of Lubbock is required. 
Surely, these are not the outcomes that we would wish to arrive at. Decades of 
entrenched racism in the political process in Lubbock ought not to be perpetuated 
merely by the good fortune of having a panel of appellate judges who cannot find an 
absurdity or constitutional violation within the text of a local voting system. Nor 
should sophisticated statutory drafting which targets minorities with almost surgical 
precision be acquitted by virtue of its failing to produce a textual reading which is 
absurd or unconstitutional. Here, in discrimination cases of this kind, we find the 
limits of textualism.  
If textualism will not suffice, then some other form of statutory interpretation 
must suffice. Purposivism, adequately provide a means to examine and interpret a 
statute when the statute’s plain text and its evident purpose contradict each other. 
This allows a reviewing court to look beneath the text of the statute, even one that is 
facially neutral, and look at the intent of its framers. Without such an option, the 
McCrory court could never have considered the fact that the North Carolina 
legislature supplied itself with exhaustive amounts of data on the voting habits of 
black voters before targeting those very same voters with nearly surgical precision. 
Nor would the Jones court have been able to consider the history of racism and fear 
of racial voting equality that drove the creation of the at-large voting system in 
Lubbock. This just goes to show that, in cases involving discrimination, textualism 
may not be up to the task of evaluating increasingly sophisticated and well-disguised 
discriminatory laws. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Textualism reigns as the statutory interpretation method of choice for the 
United States Supreme Court, as well as in many of the appellate courts, due in part 
to its pragmatic approach to the task of interpreting statutes in an impersonal 
manner and due in part to the efforts of staunch advocates such as the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook. In dealing with cases alleging 
statutory violations, textualism has been remarkably adaptable at providing judges 
with a means to address the issues of the case without recourse to outside sources 
such a committee reports or legislative history, which do not make up part of the 
statutory code. Despite, or perhaps due to, the rapid success of textualism since the 
1980s, legislatures and special interest groups have become more sophisticated in 
drawing statutes which are facially neutral, yet deeply discriminatory in nature.  
While it has largely been accepted by textualists that sources such as 
legislative history may be considered in cases where strict adherence to the text 
would result in an absurd or unconstitutional outcome, there has been little 
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discussion about what should happen when a facially neutral statute results in the 
court upholding discriminatory laws. In such cases alleging discriminatory statutes, 
it may in fact be desirable to automatically consult the legislative history in order to 
divine whether such discrimination was truly the legislature’s intent. 
 
